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COVERT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
OF MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME
BY PROXY: THE EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION
Beatrice Crofts Yorkert
I. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION
MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME BY PROXY (MSBP)2 is a
form of child abuse in which a parent, most often a
mother, fabricates or induces illness in a child in order to gain
medical attention. The term Munchausen Syndrome is named
for the Baron Karl von Munchausen, who traveled widely and
told fanciful tales of his adventures. The term is used to de-
scribe persons who intentionally produce or feign physical or
psychological symptoms with the motivation of assuming the
t Associate Provost for Faculty Relations and Associate Professor in Nursing, Geor-
gia State University; B.S., Indiana University, 1975; M.S., Child and Adolescent Psychiat-
ric Nursing, University of California, San Francisco, 1978; J.D., Georgia State University,
1988.
The author wishes to acknowledge Dr. Bernard Kahan for many years of collaboration
regarding the clinical aspects of detection of MSBP, Vicky Gribble, pediatric nurse and
graduate research assistant enrolled in the College of Law at Georgia State University, and
the dedicated staff of Scottish Rite Children's Medical Center in Atlanta, GA.
1. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 725 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV] (classifying Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy under the heading of Factitious Disorders by Proxy). While Factitious
Disorder by Proxy (FDP) is the currently correct title, this article uses the term Munchau-
sen Syndrome by Proxy because it is so widely used in the literature. See also Roy
Meadow, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: The Hinterland of Child Abuse, THE LANCET,
Aug. 13, 1977, at 343 (addressing use of the term Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy to
label mothers who make their children ill).
2. Donna A. Rosenberg, Web of Deceit: A Literature Review of Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 547, 555 (1987) (finding that 98% of
abusers are biologic mothers and 2% are adoptive mothers). A survey by protective service
workers conducted in 1991 found 77 suspected cases of MSBP in which 90% of perpetra-
tors were mothers, 1.4% were fathers, 4.3% were foster/surrogate mothers, 2.9% were
grandmothers, and 1.4% were babysitters. Bernard Kahan & Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Un-
published Survey of Protective Services Workers, Georgia State University (1991) (on file
with the author).
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sick role.3 When a person exhibits illness fabrication with a de-
pendent in their care, rather than themselves, the term "by
proxy" is applied. There are over two hundred documented
case studies of MSBP.4 The vast majority of published cases
are in pediatric, psychiatric, and medical journals, with less
than ten articles in the legal literature.5
There are numerous obstacles to intervention in MSBP
cases.6 First, there is a general lack of awareness on the part of
health professionals of the possibility that an illness may have
been intentionally produced.7 Second, the mothers who engage
in falsifying their child's illness are described as exemplary
mothers, quite contrary to the typical child abuse perpetrator.8
3. Richard Asher, Munchausen's Syndrome, THE LANCET, Feb. 10, 1951, at 339-41.
4. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 552 (reviewing 117 published cases). Additional cases
were described in clinical studies presented by Judith Libow of Children's Hospital in Oak-
land, California at the Division of Family and Children's Health Services Social Services
Conference in Atlanta, Georgia in January, 1995, and Catherine Ayoub of Massachusetts
General Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts at the American Professional Association on
the Abuse of Children, in San Diego, California, also in January, 1995.
5. See Bernard Kahan & Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy:
Clinical Review and Legal Issues, 9 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 73, 78 (1991) (noting that
psychiatric diagnostic systems sometimes do not even include classification of MSBP);
Robert Kinscherff & Richard Famularo, Extreme Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: The
Case for Termination of Parental Rights, 40 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 41 (1991); Beatrice
Crofts Yorker & Bernard Kahan, The Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Variant of Child
Abuse in the Family Courts, 42 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 51 (1991). See also Stephen J. Boros
& Larry C. Brnbaker, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Case Accounts, 61 FBI L. EN-
FORCEMENT BULL., June 1992, at 16, 20 (articulating the warning signs of MSBP in an
effort to help law enforcement officers identify perpetrators and aid the victims); Kathryn
A. Hanon, Child Abuse: Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy, 60 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL., Dec. 1991, at 8, 8-11 (discussing general symptoms and characteristics of MSBP).
For a review of the British legal literature, see Barbara Mitchels, Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy: Protection or Correction, 23 NEw L.J. 105 (1983); Catherine Williams, Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Bizarre Form of Child Abuse, 16 FAMILY LAW 32, 33
(1986) (advocating the wardship of children in MSBP as it allows for the removal of chil-
dren from the mother in an emergency upon showing risk or harm); Catherine Williams &
Vaughan T. Bevan, The Secret Observation of Children in Hospitals, THE LANCET, Apr.
2, 1988, at 700 (discussing justifications for surveillance of MSBP patients). See also Me-
lissa Searle, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Guide for California Attorneys, 10 W.
ST. L. REV. 393, 397 (1993) (discussing Rosenberg's study).
6. See, e.g., David. A. Waller, Obstacles to the Treatment of Munchausen by Proxy
Syndrome, 22 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 80-85, 80 (1983) (outlining the obstacles
to adequate assessment and care for a child).
7. Herbert Schrier & Judith Libow, HURTING FOR LOVE: MUNCHAUSEN BY PROXY
SYNDROME 42 (1993) (discussing a variety of barriers to intervention and stating that the
possibility that intentional and deceptive acts could be a cause of confusing or recurrent
symptoms is simply not part of the mindset of the average physician).
8. One of the hallmark warning signs of MSBP is that the perpetrator mothers are
described as competent, caring, and totally devoted to their children. Id. at 16.
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Third, it is difficult to obtain evidence of a parent secretively
producing symptoms.9 Finally, the courts are reluctant to be-
lieve that this form of symptom production is potentially lethal
to a child.' 0
The spectrum of MSBP includes "help-seekers," "doctor
addicts," and "active inducers."" The first type covers anxious
mothers who cannot be reassured that their child is not ill.
They may exaggerate or lie about their child's symptoms in or-
der to continue getting the doctor's attention. In the second
group, some perpetrators will actually fabricate symptoms,
sometimes adding their own menstrual blood to the child's
urine, stool, or gastric content laboratory specimens. 2 Such
fabrication results in numerous unnecessary diagnostic proce-
dures. Most MSBP victims are subjected to frequent and pro-
longed hospitalizations that are injurious to the child because
they interfere with normal peer relationships and contribute to
the child's self-concept as a chronically ill patient.'" The most
dangerous type of MSBP perpetrator is the parent who actually
produces symptoms in a child. However, even the perpetrators
who fabricate or exaggerate symptoms are also considered
harmful as any needle-stick, surgery, or insertion of tubes into
the rectum, urethra, esophagus, or bronchus that is not abso-
lutely medically justified constitutes child abuse. Examples of
"active inducers"' 4 include mothers who smother or asphyxiate
a child to produce apnea, or remove blood from intravenous
tubing to cause anemia, inject a child with medications to pro-
9. The Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV states that "the
type and severity of signs and symptoms [of MSBP] are limited only by the medical so-
phistication and opportunities of the perpetrator. Cases are often characterized by an atypi-
cal clinical course in the victim, and inconsistent laboratory test results that are at variance
with the seeming health of the victim." DSM IV, supra note 1, at 725.
10. See, e.g., Kinscherff & Famularo, supra note 5, at 47.
11. See Judith A. Libow & Herbert A. Schrier, Three Forms of Factitious Illness in
Children: When is It Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy?, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
602, 604-09 (1986) (giving examples of the three types of MSBP).
12. See Meadow, supra note 1, at 344 (describing how mothers fabricate their
child's symptoms).
13. Tona L. McGuire & Kenneth W. Feldman, Psychologic Morbidity of Children
Subjected to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 83 PEDIATRIcS 289, 292 (1989) (describ-
ing how MSBP victims often adopt Munchausen Syndrome behavior later in life).
14. Libow & Schrier, supra note 11, at 606 (noting that "active inducers" are both
the most described and sensational of MSBP cases).
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duce a variety of symptoms, poison a child, or introduce infec-
tious agents into the skin, tissue, or bloodstream. 15
Evidence that a parent is causing or fabricating the child's
illness is very difficult to obtain since the symptom production
is done quite secretively. Successful methods of obtaining evi-
dence against the mother include toxicologic studies that reveal
medications not prescribed by the doctor or other toxic agents.
Eyewitness accounts of the perpetrators' actions also provide
direct evidence. The most compelling form of circumstantial
evidence in MSBP cases is improvement of the child's condition
upon separation from the mother. 16 Additionally, expert testi-
mony regarding MSBP has aided criminal prosecutions and ju-
venile custody proceedings in determining that the mother was
causing the child's illness.17 One of the most effective ways of
detecting active induction of symptoms is through covert video
surveillance in the child's hospital room.i"
Hospital personnel have obtained evidence of many such
activities through surreptitious video surveillance. For instance,
one video shows a mother who has brought her child to the
emergency room on repeated occasions for apnea reaching over
the side of the crib, placing her hand over the infant's mouth
and nose while the infant struggles.' 9 Another video shows a
mother looking over her shoulder into the hallway, taking a
piece of plastic wrap out of her purse, and repeatedly placing it
over her child's mouth and nose until the nursing staff inter-
venes.20 Another video shows an eighteen-month-old boy hospi-
talized for recurrent bouts of severe diarrhea who did not im-
prove until the mother was convinced to leave the hospital and
15. Asher, supra note 3, at 552 (noting that the three most recurrent symptoms prior
to death are apnea, decreased level of consciousness, and bleeding).
16. Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Legal Issues in Factitious Disorder by Proxy, in THE
SPECTRUM OF FAc'rrious DisORDaRS (Marc Feldman & Stuart Eisendrath eds.) (forth-
coming 1996).
17. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(describing expert witness' testimony regarding MSBP behavior by a mother who deliber-
ately added a sodium compound into the food of each of her children which resulted in
poisoning).
18. Martin P. Samuels & David P. Southall, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 47
BRIT. J. Hosp. MED. 759, 760 (1992) (arguing that video recordings made without the
parent's knowledge provides the most definitive evidence of MSBP).
19. See Carol L. Rosen et al., Two Siblings With Recurrent Cardio-Respiratory Ar-
rest: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy or Child Abuse?, 71 PEDIATaIcS 715, 715-20
(1983) (describing two case studies of parentally induced cardio respiratory arrest).
20. Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 29, 1992).
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spend some time at home away from the child. Within twenty-
four hours of the mother's return to the hospital, she was ob-
served twice squirting the contents of a syringe in the child's
mouth. Hospital security searched the room and found empty
syringes and containers of castor oil, milk of magnesia, pheno-
barbital elixir, and other drugs that were completely contrain-
dicated for the child's care.21 Still another video shows a
mother sticking her finger down her own throat in the bath-
room, and then returning to her child's crib carrying a partially
filled emesis basin, only to call the nurse into the room, stating
that the child had just thrown up.22 The author has personally
observed a videotape that showed a mother rinsing a thermom-
eter under running water, then calling in the nurse to read an
elevated temperature. 3 Videotaped evidence has been used to
both confront the mothers with evidence of their harmful be-
havior and to convince protective service workers that these
children had been abused.
Health care personnel are eager for legal guidance regard-
ing the best way to obtain evidence of this form of child abuse.
There is currently no case law regarding the admissibility of
covert video surveillance in the prosecution of MSBP cases.
This Article will analyze the constitutional provisions relating
to search and seizure, review anti-wiretapping legislation, and
discuss related case law.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
21. Mark A. Epstein et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Considerations in Di-
agnosis and Confirmation by Video Surveillance, 80 PEDIATRuCS 220, 221 (1987) (present-
ing one incident to illustrate the characteristics of MSBP).
22. American Health Consultants, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, HosP. RIsK
MGmTr., Mar. 1993, at 33, 40 (discussing hospitals' duty to protect pediatric patients from
abusive parents).
23. This surveillance video was viewed in preparation for a Juvenile Court hearing in
Cobb County, Georgia.
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
2 4
With the advent of electronic wiretapping technology, the
courts have recognized the potential for surreptitious eaves-
dropping to violate the securities outlined in the Fourth
Amendment.2 5 The landmark case of Katz v. United States de-
fines governmental electronic surveillance as a "search" under
the Fourth Amendment if it violates an individual's "reasona-
ble expectation of [p]rivacy."28 In reversing it's earlier scope of
Fourth Amendment protection that had been limited to an
owner's private property, the Supreme Court in Katz extended
the Fourth Amendment protection to "people, not places."' 7
This concept was further expanded into a two-pronged test ar-
ticulated in Smith v. Maryland.8 The two-pronged test re-
quires that first, a person must have "exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy," and second, that the
expectation must be "one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.' "29
In United States v. White, the Supreme Court further
clarified the "expectation of privacy" test by allowing the use
of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance with the consent
of only one party.30 The lack of privacy expected by an individ-
ual who talks to an informant may be analogized to MSBP
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. See Kent Greenfield, Cameras in Teddy Bears: Electronic Visual Surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. 0n. L. REv. 1045, 1047 (1991) (summarizing Justice
Brandeis' dissent that the unregulated use of technology endangers the public's "right to be
let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued" by "civilized"
people, and asserting that electronic video surveillance (EVS) allows for the absolute in-
fringement of privacy). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928),
(Brandeis J., dissenting) overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (stating
that the wiretapping of a defendant's phone by federal officers is an unlawful invasion of
privacy which violates the Fourth Amendment).
26. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-35 (1967) (holding that unreasonable
searches of telephone interceptions are prohibited because individuals have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" during a phone conversation, even when conducted from a public
phone booth).
27. Id. at 351 (asserting that what an individual seeks to maintain as private "even
in an area accessible to the public may be constitutionally protected").
28. 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies only
where the individual can claim a "legitimate expectation of privacy" violated by govern-
ment action).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
30. 401 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1971) (stating that there is no constitutionally protected
expectation that a person with whom he or she is conversing will not relay the conversation
to the police).
[Vol. 5:325
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cases. Without electronic surveillance, information gained by
any informant is admissible; "[in these circumstances, 'no in-
terest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is in-
volved,'" for the Fourth Amendment affords no protection to
"a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he vol-
untarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal [the informa-
tion] ."31 The majority believed that simply taping an inform-
ant's conversation did not substantially alter one's expectation
of privacy.
Justice Douglas vehemently dissented:
Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human pri-
vacy ever known. How most forms of it can be held "reasona-
ble" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is a mys-
tery. To be sure, the Constitution and Bill of Rights are not
to be read as covering only the technology known in the 18th
century. Otherwise its concept of "commerce" would be
hopeless when it comes to the management of modern affairs.
At the same time the concepts of privacy which the Founders
enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when
we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming
law and order, efficiency, and other benign purposes, to pene-
trate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them
from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give
them the health and strength to carry on.32
This interpretation of electronic eavesdropping as a "search" in
Fourth Amendment terms means that the warrant require-
ments apply, and evidence obtained without a warrant is sub-
ject to the exclusionary rule.33 To be valid, a search warrant
requires a finding of "probable cause" by a neutral magistrate
who confirms that the warrant states with particularity the
area to be searched and the items to be found. Further, there
must be "a 'substantial basis for conclud[ing]' that a search
[will] uncover evidence of wrongdoing. '13
The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to this gen-
eral rule for a search warrant. These exceptions have been up-
31. Id. at 749 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
32. Id. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting the need for a "strict construction"
of the Fourth Amendment).
33. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that any evidence ob-
tained by an unconstitutional search or seizure is inadmissable in state court).
34. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (alteration in original) (citing Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960), which provided the traditional standard for
reviewing the issuance of search warrants).
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held in "exigent circumstances," such as when a suspect is be-
lieved to soon destroy the evidence. 5 Similarly, if there is a
concern that persons may be in danger, a warrantless search is
justified.38 Other courts have emphasized that the exigent cir-
cumstances exception generally involves an imminent or "im-
mediate" threat to human life.3 7
Although the Fourth Amendment does not specify the ex-
clusion of evidence seized by government agents, in 1914 the
Court held in Weeks v. United States that evidence obtained
through an unlawful search and seizure by federal agents could
not be admitted in federal criminal trials. 8 Then, in Burdeau
v. McDowell, the Supreme Court narrowed this holding, find-
ing that evidence obtained in an illegal search was not excluded
from trial when obtained by a private party.39 Despite Judge
Brandeis' indignation at the Court's failure to sanction illegal
acts,4 ° the majority "reasoned that the drafters of the Constitu-
tion never intended to restrain the activities of individuals who
are not employed by the government."'" Simply stated, the ex-
clusionary rule has no impact upon individuals whose search is
motivated by purely personal reasons since it was intended to
35. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292 (1973) (upholding the collection of evidence
without a warrant where the defendant refused to allow the police to scrape what appeared
to be blood from his finger because of the high probability that the blood would be removed
while a warrant was obtained).
36. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, A Judge Upholds Evidence Seized at Simpson
Home, N.Y. TIMS, July 8, 1994, at Al (describing the ruling that a warrantless search of
O.J. Simpson's home was justified by the brutal nature of the crimes and the reasonable
belief that people inside the home could be in danger).
37. U.S. v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 611-12 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding that since nar-
cotics do not present an immediate danger to the public or to police, the exigent circum-
stances exception is inapplicable).
38. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (finding prejudicial error where a federal court admit-
ted letters into evidence that had been transferred by federal agents in violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
39. 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (noting that the history and origin of the fourth
Amendment should apply to government agents and not private actors).
40. Id. at 477 (Brandeis J., dissenting) (asserting that failure to sanction illegal acts
will undermine the public's respect for the law).
41. Id. at 475. See Austin A. Andersen, The Admissibility of Evidence Located in
Searches by Private Persons, 58 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Apr. 1963, at 15 (noting the
majority's reasoning that the Constitution was intended solely to restrain governmental
actors).
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deter overzealous police officers from conducting illegal
searches and seizures.42
Immunity of private parties from the exclusionary rule has
evolved through the years, providing guidance on a number of
issues. In Torres v. State, a burglar allegedly broke into the
defendant's apartment and found child pornography depicting
the defendant engaged in illegal acts with a three-year-old
child.,3 This information was sent anonymously to the police
and was found admissible in court because of the defendant's
inability to prove that the anonymous burglar had acted in con-
cert with the police." A review of cases in which there was
some degree of governmental involvement with the search illus-
trates that searches governed by the Fourth Amendment rest
on issues such as who initiates the search45 and who controls
the search.46 In Gold v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held
that the government must explicitly instigate the search for the
exclusionary rule to apply.47
III. CASE LAW REGARDING "REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY" AND VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE
The Framers of the Constitution undoubtedly never envi-
sioned the technological capabilities available in the 1990s to
record and electronically communicate activities that were eas-
ily kept private in the 1700s. Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez
v. United States,"" which later became the philosophy of the
Court in Katz, states: "Electronic aids add a wholly new di-
42. Anderson, supra note 41, at 25-26 (describing the Court's reasoning that the
exclusionary rule is not among the private remedies for private actors who unlawfully ob-
tain evidence).
43. 442 N.E. 2d 1021, 1023 (Ind. 1982).
44. See Andersen, supra note 41, at 26 (discussing Torres). See also State v. Dold,
722 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (placing the burden of proof for showing
collusion between the police and the citizen-informant on the defendant).
45. See United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding the
Fourth Amendment applicable where the government "knowingly acquits and encourages
directly or indirectly a private citizen" to initiate a motion if the citizens' sole motivation to
act is the expectation of a reward).
46. See State v. Cox, 674 P.2d 1127, 1130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (holding the
Fourth Amendment applicable for a search conducted by the joint effort of private and
governmental actors).
47. 378 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding a search warrant unnecessary where
airline agents initiate and conduct a search for their own purposes).
48. 373 U.S. 427, 446 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mension to eavesdropping. They make it more penetrating,
more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society.
Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient;
and police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyr-
anny."' 9 Interestingly, these strong words were written long
before the advent of electronic video surveillance (EVS).
Kent Greenfield discusses the relationship between the Su-
preme Court cases about wiretapping technology and the po-
tential for further electronic surveillance capabilities.50 In Ber-
ger v. New York,51 the Court reviewed various kinds of
"sophisticated electronic devices" available at the time and
those capable of eavesdropping on anyone in almost any given
situation. ' 52 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the admissi-
bility of EVS, as distinct from wiretapping technology; how-
ever, many lower federal courts have entertained discussions re-
garding EVS. As Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit stated,
"television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive ... and inher-
ently indiscriminate, and . . . could be grossly abused to elimi-
nate personal privacy as understood in modern Western na-
tions."53 The judicial decisions rendered thus far permitting or
excluding video surveillance evidence provide some parameters
within which to judge covert video surveillance of MSBP.
A. Video Surveillance of Public Areas or "In Plain View"
It has long been established that surveillance of areas that
are visible to the public eye are admissible under the "plain
view" doctrine. 5' For example, video surveillance tapes of sus-
pected gambling activities conducted in various locations in two
Detroit bars over a period of 152 days were admitted as evi-
49. Id. at 466.
50. Greenfield, supra note 25, at 1057-77.
51. 388 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1967) (distinguishing wiretaps from the sophisticated elec-
tronic devices called "bugs").
52. Greenfield, supra note 25, at 1049 (noting that "the Court was astute in starting
its analysis this way, for the measure of danger to Fourth Amendment interests is not
capped by the level of technology actually used in any specific case, but by the technology
that government could bring to bear").
53. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1087 (1985) (holding that the District Court was authorized to issue a warrant for
video surveillance of a terrorist group's "safe house").
54. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (holding that a registration
card from a stolen car that fell into the plain view of a police officer is admissible into
evidence).
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dence to show that several Detroit police officers maintained
contact with a known criminal.55 The video surveillance camera
was placed in a hole in the wall between one of the bars and
the adjoining space rented by the police.56 In its decision to
admit the electronic evidence, the court reasoned:
The Anchor Bar is a public tavern. Therefore, people in the
bar must expect to be observed by those members of the pub-
lic who patronize the bar. A video tape machine, insofar as it
photographs only, is merely making a permanent record of
what any member of the general public would see if he en-
tered the tavern as a patron. Accordingly, to photograph Ser-
geant Rickard's presence in the bar did not violate his "rea-
sonable expectations of privacy." The Fourth Amendment
protects only "reasonable expectations of privacy. 57
The circumstances of the following 1983 case are particu-
larly relevant to determining the expectation of privacy in a
hospital room. In State v. Abislaiman,58 a hospital security sys-
tem placed security cameras on the top of light poles in the
hospital parking lot. An off-duty police officer was hired to
work with security personnel and monitor the security cameras
from a room containing remote control equipment. The defend-
ant in the case drove into the parking lot and remained in the
car. The security officer used the zoom lens of the camera to
look directly into the front seat of the car whereby he observed
the defendant rolling an unidentifiable substance into a ciga-
rette wrapper and removing a gun from his waistband. The of-
ficer approached the car and asked the occupant to step out.
The officer then seized the gun, a small bag of marijuana, and
some quaaludes which were visible in the car.59 The Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order to sup-
press the physical evidence. Judge Nesbitt, writing for the ma-
jority, provided perhaps the most cogent rationale regarding
Fourth Amendment protection and expectations of privacy in a
hospital:
55. Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dep't, 211 N.W.2d 674, 687 (Mich. Ct. App.
1973).
56. Id. The surveillance was not originally aimed at these officers; however, the
agents on surveillance duty noticed these officers frequently visited the bars and appeared
friendly to the primary target of the investigation. Id.
57. Id. at 687.
58. State v. Abislaiman, 437 So.2d 181, 182-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
59. Id. at 183.
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Because accidents and illnesses occur at all hours, a hospital's
emergency room parking lot is one of the few places where
one would expect a certain amount of traffic even at 2:30
a.m.... The hospital certainly has a right to protect its pa-
tients, employees, and property by employing reasonable se-
curity measures. 60
Another location where no constitutionally protected ex-
pectation of privacy has been recognized is an accessible, view-
able area in a place of employment. In United States v. Fel-
der,6 1 a hidden television camera was placed in an open work
area. Investigators observed an employee stealing several gov-
ernment checks. The court held that the video surveillance did
not intrude upon any expectation of privacy.
There are, however, limits to permissible video surveillance
of public places.6 2 Contrary to the permissible surveillance in
Felder,6" public employees do have some expectations of pri-
vacy. 4 For example, surveillance of a private office with a
locked door would likely require a warrant. 5 Also, cameras lo-
cated above the stalls of public restrooms to observe any illicit
sexual behavior have been found to violate the "momentary oc-
cupants' expectations of privacy." 66
B. Video Surveillance in Protected Areas
Some courts have inferred an extension of the decision in
United States v. White,6 7 which permits audiotaping with the
consent of one party, to videotaping with only one party's con-
sent. For example, an undercover agent was permitted to intro-
60. Id. (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital emergency room
parking lot).
61. 572 F. Supp. 17, 19 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 722 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding
video surveillance of a federal government part-time employee permissible).
62. See generally Robert Fiatal, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment (pt. 1), 58 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Jan. 1989, at 23 (reviewing
the constitutionality of video surveillance in publicly accessible areas).
63. Felder, 572 F. Supp. at 19.
64. See generally Daniel Schofield, Fourth Amendment Rights of Law Enforcement
Employees Against Searches in their Workplace, 56 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL, July
1987, at 24 (discussing organizational policy and procedures that are consistent with
Fourth Amendment requirements and also meet legitimate law enforcement objectives).
65. Fiatal, supra note 62, at 26 (asserting that individuals have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy for activities within a private, closed office).
66. See People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (analogizing
bathroom stalls to the telephone booth cited in Katz).
67. 401 U.S. 745, 745 (1971).
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duce evidence of a videotaped narcotics transaction from a two-
way mirror in a hotel room.6 8 In another case, a victim of sex-
ual assault by her physician was permitted to introduce video
evidence obtained through a hidden camera in her home. 69
IV. LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, which was amended by the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986,70 addressed and codified sugges-
tions by the Supreme Court for monitoring electronic audio
communications as listed in Berger v. New York, including:7 1
(1) That the judicial official approving the electronic surveil-
lance order certify that "normal investigative procedures
have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; '72
(2) That the electronic surveillance warrant contain "a par-
ticular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to
which it relates;17 3
(3) That the period of the electronic surveillance be no
"longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the au-
thorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days;"' 74 and
(4) That the interceptions must "be conducted in such a way
as to minimize the interception of communications not other-
wise subject to interception. 75
The seminal case regarding EVS is United States v.
Torres,76 where the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court's
68. State v. Jennings, 611 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Idaho 1980) (finding a person's expecta-
tion to privacy is no greater when being videotaped than when being tape recorded).
69. Avery v. State, 292 A.2d 728, 743 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (finding no consti-
tutional violation where the video transmission evidence was transmitted with the full coop-
eration and consent of the victim).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (defining what type of electronic
surveillance may be undertaken by law enforcement officials, who must approve the surveil-
lance, what parties may undertake the surveillance, and what types of action may be inter-
cepted using electronic surveillance).
71. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46-49 (1967) (expressing concern over the
pervasiveness of sophisticated electronic devices and the possible intrusiveness into individ-
ual's privacy).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3)(c) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
73. Id. § 2518 (4)(c).
74. Id. § 2518 (5).
75. Id.
76. 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
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authorization of covert television surveillance inside an apart-
ment used as a "safe house" for terrorists assembling bombs.77
The court looked to Title III for guidance and incorporated the
four warrant requirements listed above in their decision.78 To
date, these warrant requirements have been used by courts in
the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, in district
courts in New York and California, and in New York and Ma-
ryland state courts. The Seventh Circuit, however, remains the
only court to apply both the warrant requirements and the rea-
sonableness balancing test to EVS cases.79 The "reasonable-
ness" balancing test weighs "privacy interests, as measured by
the level of intrusion of the search, against the strength of the
government interests, as measured by the availability of other
evidence, and the severity of the suspected crime.'"80
Title III was enacted to protect the privacy of wire and
oral communications and to provide uniform guidelines regard-
ing interception.8 1 It does not specifically address EVS. "Unlike
wiretapping and eavesdropping, however, the use of videotape
cameras for surreptitious observance of domestic crimes and
domestic criminals in nonpublic areas is neither authorized nor
prohibited by any federal statute."' The Second Circuit enter-
tained a challenge to surreptitious video surveillance of private
premises in United States v. Biasucci,83 using Title III grounds
77. Id. at 883-86 (finding the four statutory provisions of Title III provide the consti-
tutional guidelines for government authorization of covert television surveillance). For a
complete discussion of the Torres construction of Title III, see Greenfield, supra note 25,
at 1054-55.
78. See Greenfield, supra note 25, at 1054.
79. Id. at 1069 (recommending that because EVS is such a severe intrusion, it
should be analogized to an unconsented surgical intrusion to the body, such as the "sub-
stantial" intrusion of surgical removal of a bullet from the defendant in Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985)). Greenfield argues that a judge should not allow EVS unless
there is a compelling need or other evidence providing probable cause for arrest. Id. at
1072. A compelling need exists if the crime is serious, and most probably, cause would not
exist without use of EVS evidence. Id.
80. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2153 (asserting that Title III was enacted to legislate the constitutional requirements
for electronic eavesdropping based upon the standards set forth in Berger and Katz).
81. Cheryl Spinner, Let's Go to the Videotape: The Second Circuit Sanctions Covert
Video Surveillance of Domestic Criminals, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 469, 471-72 (1987) (stating
that the only federal statute authorizing video surveillance is limited to national security
investigations and foreign intelligence matters).
82. Id.
83. 786 F.2d 504, 507-12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1987) (finding
that the four provisions of Title III provide the measure of the government's constitutional
obligations when obtaining a warrant for video surveillance).
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by analogizing EVS to wiretapping. In Biasucci, the FBI had
obtained a warrant that met all four criteria and installed cov-
ert video surveillance in a privately operated loan office. The
court admitted the videotaped evidence of the illegal lending
activities occurring at the private office. The defendants argued
that the FBI violated Title III because it does not authorize the
use of EVS even with a warrant. The Court concluded that the
statute did not prohibit or authorize EVS and upheld the use of
the tapes as evidence.84 Legal commentators have noted the
anomaly this creates in the law by essentially requiring less
regulation for EVS than for wiretapping."5 The legal commen-
taries in Torres and Biasucci are limited to surveillance of pri-
vate premises, however, and a hospital room is arguably not
afforded the same protection as private premises.
There is debate regarding the applicability of Title III to
the audio portion of covert video surveillance of MSBP. The
Attorney General of Alabama has issued a verbal ruling
prohibiting sound recording in MSBP surveillance.88 Hospital
attorneys in other states permit both sound and video record-
ings under the special circumstances of MSBP.
V. APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO COVERT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF MSBP
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
It is prudent to examine an individual's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in a hospital room by applying Justice
Harlan's two-pronged test.s7 First, would a parent of a hospi-
talized child have an "actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy?" 88 The parents who have been detected smothering their
children on surreptitious video surveillance have presumably
not expected the surveillance. Of at least eight mothers con-
fronted with causing symptoms in the child through evidence
obtained from covert video surveillance, six expressed outrage
at the violation of their privacy. The literature on confrontation
84. Id. at 508.
85. Greenfield, supra note 25, at 1046; Spinner, supra note 81, at 482.
86. Conversation with John R. Huthnance, Assistant Attorney General, State of Al-
abama (Jan. 4, 1995).
87. American Health Consultants, supra note 22, at 40 (discussing the installation of
a surveillance camera system in Scottish Rite Children's Medical Center in Atlanta).
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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generally supports the presumption that parents who expect
privacy in the hospital room were shocked to realize their be-
havior had been observed. However, this reaction is consistent
with the feelings of almost every defendant whom the courts
have found to have had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, legal commentators have suggested that the sub-
jective prong of the test may be unrealistic, particularly since it
is not specified in the majority opinion in Katz."9
Society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable" 90 the sec-
ond prong of the test, which is the most useful in addressing
MSBP. The health care community, child protective services,
and the courts support the idea that society would not consider
an expectation of privacy in a pediatric hospital room to be
"reasonable." Hospitals are busy places with a variety of diag-
nostic forms of surveillance carried out on a routine basis, such
as cardiac monitors and telemetry equipment wired to monitors
in the nurses station, sleep study rooms with infrared photogra-
phy equipment, and intercoms that connect patient rooms with
the nurses station. In fact, patients expect a certain degree of
monitoring and vigilance as part of promoting patient safety. In
Buchanan v. State,91 the court held that the defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital emer-
gency room since a constant flow of medical personnel walked
in and out of the room. Similarly, the court in Abislaiman sup-
ported the right of a hospital to employ security measures and
concluded "any subjective expectation of privacy Abislaiman
may have formed while parked in the hospital's lot was simply
not one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. '92
The court in Abislaiman specifically cited Katz and Smith v.
Maryland, favoring the second prong of Harlan's test over the
first.93
89. Id.
90. Id. at 347-61. Only Justice Harlan's concurrence utilizes the two-prong test. See
also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, MINN. LAW REV.
349, 384 (1974) (asserting that the subjective prong neither adds to or detracts from an
individual's expectation of privacy).
91. 432 So.2d 147, 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
92. State v. Abislaiman, 437 So.2d 181, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
93. Id. at 183-84.
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B. Exceptions Recognized Under the Fourth Amendment
In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling specifically on
the use of EVS and without any lower court decisions regard-
ing the admissibility of covert video surveillance in MSBP situ-
ations, a judicial interpretation in favor of a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in a hospital room is a possibility. Terry
Thomas, a British attorney, discusses the highly intrusive na-
ture of surreptitious video surveillance, even in MSBP situa-
tions.94 Clinicians here and in England also have raised ethical
issues regarding the potential invasion of privacy during MSBP
surveillance.9 5 If the expectation of privacy were found to be
reasonable, then either a warrant should be obtained prior to
instituting EVS, or the surveillance should be examined to de-
termine whether it meets one of the recognized exceptions to
obtaining a warrant.
1. Exigent Circumstances
The case law is supportive of warrantless searches if dan-
ger to human life is "imminent." 96 Certainly hospital security
and medical personnel would argue that a mother who is sus-
pected of smothering her child poses an "immediate danger" to
human life. Ten different studies show that the mortality of
victims of MSBP ranges from 5% to 55%, averaging at
12% .9
On the other hand, arguments can be made that it takes
only a short time longer to obtain a warrant than it does to
prepare for covert video surveillance. However, the issue of
swift surveillance is not purely one of imminent danger in
94. See Terry Thomas, Covert Video Surveillance, 144 NEw L.J., 966, 966-67
(1994) (discussing and criticizing covert video surveillance procedures used to detect
MSBP).
95. B. J. Zitelli et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and Video Surveillance,
Reply to Frost Letter (Letter to the Editor), 142 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDHOOD 917, 917-18
(1988).
96. United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 611-12 (D.D.C. 1973) (distinguishing
the immediate and imminent danger of a shotgun from the passive danger of narcotics).
See also Janofsky, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
97. See Samuels & Southall, supra note 18, at 760. Additionally, Randell Alexan-
der, Wilbur Smith, and Richard Stevenson conducted a study of five families where 13
children were affected and more than one sibling was a victim of MSBP. There was a 31 %
mortality rate that might have been higher had intervention not occurred with some of the
children. Randell Alexander et al., Serial Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 86 PEDIAT-
iucs 581, 584 (1990).
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MSBP situations, but also one of obtaining evidence. Cupp v.
Murphy addresses the concern over the need for evidence in
the exigent circumstances reasoning.98
2. Private Party
Although Burdeau v. McDowell" was decided in 1921, it
is still valid law regarding the Supreme Court's decision that
private parties would not be governed by the exclusionary
rule.100 It is argued by some that medical personnel would
qualify as private parties. In United States v. Black, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that medical personnel were con-
sidered private parties when they initiated a search of an un-
conscious defendant's belongings and completed a physical
exam revealing drugs and drug paraphernalia.101 This ruling
explains that MSBP surveillance is permitted to fall under the
private party exception since the primary concern of hospital
personnel engaged in surveillance is the safety of their patients,
rather than criminal prosecution. Second, hospital personnel
may conduct EVS for diagnostic purposes. A difficult case,
such as a pediatric patient who has recurrent apnea (cessation
of breathing) with no identifiable medical cause, would justify
continuous video monitoring simply as a means of studying all
clinical circumstances surrounding the cessation of breathing.
It could be argued that physicians would be aided in their diag-
nosis if they were able to discern through EVS that the infant
was always on its stomach when apnea occurred. Furthermore,
if the mother is seen placing her hand over the infant's mouth
and nose immediately prior to an apnea episode, not only is
that information diagnostically useful, but it is also evidence of
a crime.
Even though commercially retained security guards, such
as those hired by hospitals, generally qualify as private parties
98. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973) (stating that the high
probability evidence will be destroyed may justify warrantless search or seizure).
99. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
100. See id. at 475.
101. No. 88-5266, 1988 WL 107375, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 1988). Specifically,
since the emergency room nurse asked a police officer to search the unconscious defend-
ant's purse for identification or medication, the court held that all of the evidence obtained
fell under the private party exception, and the warrantless search could be justified under
the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *2.
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under Burdeau,102 the Court has held that governmental em-
ployees, whether they are police officers or not, are governed by
the Fourth Amendment. This case law determination suggests
that medical personnel employed by state or federal hospitals,
including Veterans Administration hospitals, would not be con-
sidered private parties and therefore would not be exempted
from the Fourth Amendment requirements.
3. Consent
The Supreme Court's holding in White that warrantless
electronic surveillance is admissible with the consent of one
party could be applicable to cases in which the consenting
party is the nurse. Conversations between the alleged perpetra-
tor and the nurse would be admissible, 0 3 such as when the
mother tells the nurse the child has a fever or the mother
makes other statements that the video shows are false. Another
argument can be made that the infant would impliedly consent
to electronic surveillance if it is done in his or her own best
interest, thus making all EVS admissible. However, these ratio-
nales have not been scrutinized by the courts.
VI. THE APPLICABILITY OF LEGISLATION TO
COVERT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF MSBP
A. Balancing Test
Greenfield proposes that the Supreme Court balancing test
from Burger and Katz should be combined with Title III's war-
rant requirements in determining guidelines for EVS. Thus, the
severity of the crime and the availability of other evidence
should be balanced with any reasonable expectation of privacy
interests. Title III identifies other factors to be considered such
as the sufficiency of the procedure to maximize confidentiality
and to minimize opportunities for abuse.10 4 Experts on the pro-
cedures used in covert video surveillance of MSBP have pro-
posed a list of safeguards that would satisfy the minimization
102. See Austin A. Anderson, Admissability of Evidence Located in Searches in
Private Persons, 58 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., May 1989, at 25, 28 (discussing cases
applying the Burdeau rule).
103. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. See also Greenfield, supra note
25, at 1068.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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standard set out in Title III, requiring that interceptions "be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception." 105
These safeguards and the arguments against them include:108
a. Placing video monitors only on the child so that activities
of the parent not related to potential harm to the child re-
main private.
Experts argue that this proposal is possibly still inadequate, be-
cause activities that could harm a child may not occur in the
child's presence. For example, the mother may obtain illicit
medication from her purse or vomit in the bathroom in order to
falsify the child's symptoms outside the view of the EVS.
b. Implementing video recording only, with no sound, in or-
der to minimize surveillance of private conversations, such as
telephone conversations with outsiders.
Although sound recordings have been useful in situations where
the mother is lying about the child's symptoms, falsification is
arguably less imminently harmful to the child than physical
symptom production. However, as mentioned above, if falsifica-
tion causes unnecessary invasive procedures, then it constitutes
abuse.
c. Obtaining a search warrant if surveillance is thought to be
necessary for longer than forty-eight hours.
Experts have stated that if the video surveillance has primarily
a diagnostic purpose, obtaining a search warrant should not be
necessary.07
1. Private Actor Exception
Section 2515 of Title III clearly supersedes the Burdeau
decision in the case of electronic audio surveillance.10 8 The only
exception to Title III's blanket prohibition of electronic surveil-
lance by all actors, public and private, is extended to employees
of telephone companies who intercept communications in the
105. Id.
106. Conversations with Judith Libow, M.A., Oakland Children's Hospital; Marc
Feldman, M.D., University of Alabama; Larry Burbaker, FBI Agent; John Huthnance,
Attorney General's Office, Alabama; Kathy Artingstall, Florida Police Officer; and Bea-
trice Yorker, Georgia State University, in a roundtable discussion held at the Department
of Family and Children's Services Conference, Atlanta, Georgia (Jan. 1995).
107. Id.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (superseding the rule of Burdeau
that private parties are immune from the Fourth Amendment).
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usual course of business for quality or service checks.109 It
could be argued that sound monitoring in a hospital room is
done in the course of business for diagnostic purposes and for
safety reasons. Again, this line of reasoning as specifically ap-
plied to health care personnel has not been contemplated in the
statutory language. Those courts that have considered the need
for safety in hospital operations have allowed the use of EVS"0°
and warrantless searches.""'
2. Compelling Need
Greenfield suggests that EVS can only be justified by a
"compelling need," such as the commission of a serious crime
for which probable cause for arrest would not exist without
EVS." 2 The "compelling need" situation would require a war-
rant, however, unlike the "exigent circumstances" exception to
a warrant under Fourth Amendment analysis since
within the reasonableness balancing analysis, the compelling
necessity standard looks at the evidence already gathered at
the time of the application and permits EVS only if that ex-
isting evidence is insufficient for arrest. On the other hand,
the least intrusive means requirement allows a judge to grant
an application for EVS only when there are no less intrusive
means of gathering the same evidence. In other words, rea-
sonableness looks to sufficiency, whereas the least intrusive
means inquiry looks to method. Even if the reasonableness
standard is met, the least intrusive means requirement and
the other particularity requirements must be satisfied as
well."13
3. Obtaining a Warrant
If a legal challenge to covert video surveillance is success-
ful in the courts, this change would simply mean that health
care personnel would be required to enlist governmental and
police involvement by obtaining a warrant authorizing the sur-
109. Id. § 2511 (2)(a)(i) (limiting this exception to monitoring communication in the
normal course of business).
110. State v. Abislaiman, 437 So.2d 181, 181-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
the use of electronic surveillance camera in hospital parking lot to be a reasonably expected
security measure).
111. State v. Jennings, 611 P.2d at 1050, 1065 (Idaho 1980).
112. Greenfield, sypra note 25, at 1072.
113. Id. at 1072 .165.
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veillance prior to implementation. Health care providers should
follow the four provisions of Title III that govern the standards
for authorizing visual electronic surveillance under a search
warrant. These are identical to those in Biasucci and in Torres
cited previously in this article.114
VII. CONCLUSION
The serious and life-threatening nature of child abuse in
cases of MSBP provides a strong countervailing interest when
balanced against a parent's or caretaker's right of privacy.115
There are a growing number of clinical reports in the medical
literature that support the efficacy of covert video surveillance
in diagnosing MSBP and protecting the child from further
harm.""6 A careful analysis of constitutional and legislative re-
quirements for conducting covert video surveillance reveals
that, in the absence of express rulings on the issue, there is
most likely no reasonable expectation of privacy in a pediatric
hospital room. Even if there is a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in a hospital room, there are several exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule applicable to MSBP cases, including the con-
sent of one party, exigent circumstances, and the private party
exception. If the courts do decide at some future point that par-
ents have legitimate privacy interests outweighing the exigent
circumstances caused by fabricating or inducing illness in a
child, then hospital personnel should follow the legal require-
ments for obtaining a search warrant. Appropriate education of
magistrates or judges should be done by the hospital staff to
alert warrant officers regarding the warning signs of MSBP, so
that a medically based suspicion that a child's illness may be
manufactured by a parent would be viewed as meeting the
probable cause threshold necessary to obtain a warrant to au-
thorize use of EVS.
114. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
115. See Roger W. Byard & Richard H. Burnell, Covert Video Surveillance in
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 160 MED. J. AUSTL. 352, 356 (Mar. 1994) (arguing that
privacy interests are outweighed when balanced against a "potentially" homicidal patient).
116. Martin P. Samuels et al., Fourteen Cases of Imposed Upper Airway Obstruc-
tion, 67 ARCHvEs DISEASES ON CIILDREN 162, 170 (1992). See also Williams & Bevan,
supra note 5, at 780 (discussing the justifications for and necessity of secret surveillance in
MSBP parents).
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